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I. Introduction
Twelve years ago I drew attention in a paper to the importance of
the discovery of performative utterances by the well known Oxford
linguistic philosopher, John Austin, for a better understanding of
the legal concept of contract.' In The Legal Point of View, I
developed this concept into what I called the performative function
of discourse,2 and in a recent paper I applied it to rebut an attack on
the objective theory of contract. 3 My main aim in the present paper
is to compare Austin's classification of infelicities, to which
performative utterances are subject, with their legal analogues.
Although it is unlikely that Lord Denning was familiar with
Austin's concept of performative utterances, the recognition of the
performative function of discourse lends strong support to his
doctrine of equitable mistake. 4 This example shows well how
doctrinal development in the law may be strengthened by keeping
abreast of developments in philosophy, and how it may be
weakened by failing to do so. The philosophical repertoire of most
lawyers is usually antiquated, if not quaint. The same is true of the
legal repertoire of philosophers. Yet, philosophers on the whole are
more willing to learn from lawyers than the other way round. Thus,
Austin explicitly acknowledges that the nearest approach to
performative is the word operative as used by lawyers, the operative
part of a legal instrument being that part which actually performs the
legal act which it is the purpose of the instrument to perform. 5 He
also refers to contributions made by lawyers in his discussion of
infelicities. 
6
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A word of warning is necessary in view of the ascendancy of
so-called linguistic philosophy in the English speaking countries.
Legal concepts cannot be reduced to ordinary language concepts,
for the former have a much sharper and more restricted function
than the latter. We may say that legal concepts are technical or
model concepts used from the legal point of view, while ordinary
concepts are non-technical concepts which may be used from many
different points of view, including the legal point of view. Hence, a
legal concept such as contract cannot be reduced to an ordinary
language concept such as agreement, though there may be family
resemblances between the two.
According to my model, a point of view marks out an exclusive
field of interest, and the exclusive field of interest of the legal point
of view is that mode of institutional social control which is enforced
through the effective application of a norm-system by courts or
tribunals acting as norm-authorities of the system. The content of
the norms of this system is adapted for the purpose of that social
control from a range of values drawn from different points of view,
and in particular from the moral point of view which provides the
foundation of values on which a legal norm-system is built.
7
I have spoken of ordinary and model concepts, but it should not
be thought that concepts are single self-contained units with a fixed
meaning. This false picture has become embedded in our language
largely because of the apparent unity of words. Yet, it is so strong
that as long as we think in terms of concepts, we will tend to think
of them as units which remain essentially unaffected by their use in
language. So what I have proposed to do is to inhibit the false
picture of unity engendered by the word concept by means of
another picture, namely that of a bent concept. I have said that a
concept is bent by its use in language, and that beside the particular
stresses which bend a concept in particular contexts, there are
important lines of stress set up by the adoption of points of view and
models. An ordinary concept is bent by the point of view from
which the concept is used, and a model concept is bent by the model
kind: because this is regarded as a report not so much of something he said, as
which it would be hear-say and not admissible as evidence, but rather as something
he did, an action of his. This coincides very well with our initial feelings about
performatives" (Id. at 13). Under the law of evidence, however, a report of what
someone else said may be admissible, provided it is not used to show that what he
said was true.
7. Supra, note 2 at 87-88
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to which it belongs, and to the extent that it is uncontrolled by that
model, by the particular context in which it is used. 8 Hence, if
ordinary and model concepts are used from the legal point of view,
they will be bent by it in the direction of its field of interest.
The concept of performatives is a model concept which is
normally used from the philosophical point of view in the study of
ordinary language. Hence, it cannot be simply applied to the study
of legal concepts from the legal point of view. What constitutes a
legal agreement or a legal promise cannot be deduced from
philosophical conclusions about the performative use of these
concepts in ordinary language. A fortiori, whether the legal concept
of contract is based on the ordinary concept of agreement or of
promise cannot be decided according to ordinary language usage.
On the other hand, we may gain a better insight into legal concepts
through a philosophical analysis of the use of ordinary concepts, for
difficulties in legal doctrine may have their roots in misapprehen-
sions about their use.
II. Performative Utterances and Functions of Discourse
9
Austin at: first thought that he could mark off perform ative
utterances from statements or constative utterances on two main
grounds, namely that in uttering a performative we are doing and
not merely saying something, and that performative utterances are
happy or unhappy, while statements are true or false. Suppose that
in the course of a marriage ceremony I say "I do (take this woman
to be my lawful wedded wife)", or that I tread on your toe and say
"I apologize", or that I have a bottle of champagne in my hand and
say "I name this ship Queen Elizabeth". In all these cases I am
doing something and not merely saying something which is true or
false. A performative utterance is not necessarily effective or
operative. For instance, uttering the words "I marry you", or "I
divorce you", is not sufficient to perform a marriage or a divorce,
but the one thing we must not suppose is that what is needed in
addition to the saying of the words in such cases is the performance
of some internal spiritual act. For instance, the utterance "I promise
to be there tomorrow" is not a true or false report of the
performance of some inward spiritual act of promising. The act of
8. Id. at 20
9. Id. at 27-33. Austin's earlier view was stated in Philosophical Papers (supra,
note 5), and his later view in How To Do Things with Words (supra, note 6).
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promising is performed in making the promise.
Austin himself perceived later that he could not mark off a special
class of performative utterances from constative utterances on either
of these grounds. The first ground will not do, for in stating
something we are also doing something and not merely saying
something: we are making a statement and not doing something
else. Compare, for instance, "I state that he did not do it" with "I
bet that he did not do it".
The second ground on which Austin distinguished performative
from constative utterances will not do either, for the notion of
unhappiness or infelicity applies not only to the former but also to
the latter. For instance, philosophers distinguish between the falsity
of a statement and its inappropriateness when it presupposes
something which does not in fact obtain. For instance, "The King
of France is bald." Similarly, the statement "The cat is on the mat,
but I don't believe it" is infelicitous, though not in quite the same
way as the performative utterance "I promise that I shall be there,
but I don't intend to be there".
Conversely, performative utterances cannot be insulated from
truth and falsity. What all this boils down to is that we cannot draw
a sharp line between performative and constative utterances on the
ground that the former are happy or unhappy, and the latter true or
false. Happiness and truth, and unhappiness and falsity, have a way
of sliding together.
Austin recognized that the error in his earlier view consisted in
assuming that performative utterances could be marked off from
constative utterances by means of some formal characteristics of
these two classes of utterances. He came to appreciate that the same
utterance may have both a performative and a constative aspect, and
he therefore felt it necessary to start again "from the ground up".
He built his new edifice on a theory of speech acts, which is really a
generalization of performatives applied to the whole field of
language. Traditionally, philosophers had considered language
anatomically, studying the meaning of words and sentences like an
anatomist dissecting the fixed bone structure of a skeleton. The new
approach was physiological; language was conceived as a living
thing, characterized not by a set structure but by a variety of
functions which it fulfilled. 10
10. Austin shows that performative utterances cannot be limited to a particular list
of verbs, or to a particular grammatical form. Although they are typically in the
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In The Legal Point of View, I distinguish four functions of
discourse, namely the assertive, the evaluative, the prescriptive,
and the performative function. The last consists in the use of verbal
formulae for the performance of socially significant acts. For
instance, in using the formula "I promise", I perform the socially
significant act of promising. The performance of socially significant
acts has certain social consequences. For instance, promising has
the social consequence of being (generally) bound to keep one's
promise, and the further social consequence of being liable to social
disapproval for breaking it.
All the functions of discourse are idealized models of actual
functions; they are by definition mutually exclusive, but not
cumulatively exhaustive. In actual linguistic practice, the same
utterance or sentence may, even on the same occasion, serve one or
more of these functions.
III. Performative Utterances and the Formation of Contracts
I shall now attempt to show that Austin's concept of performatives
leads to a better understanding of the legal concept of contract, or to
put it in another way, that the common law's failure to recognize the
performative function of discourse has created difficulties in
contract doctrine which can be cured by paying attention to it. The
view that performative utterances, that is, utterances used for the
performative function of discourse, such as I offer, I accept, I
agree, I promise, are reports of mental states is no doubt at least
partly responsible for the so-called subjective view of contract,
according to which a contract is the outward expression of a union
of minds. This view originated on the Continent, and although
considerable lip service was and still is being paid to the Latin tag
that there must be consensus ad idem, the so-called objective view
has in fact prevailed in the common law countries. It is tempting to
correlate the latter with Austin's view that performative utterances
are operative in their own right, but in England at least the objective
view of contract is usually stated in the form of a rule of estoppel.
first person singular present indicative active, they need not be in that form. A
performative utterance may be made in the second or third person passive. For.
instance, "You are hereby authorized to pay", "Passengers are warned". Mood
will not do either, since I may order you to turn right by saying not "I order you to
turn right", but simply "Turn right". Tense will not do, for instead of saying "I
call you off-side", I may say simply, "You were off-side". (Supra, note 6 at 55
ff.)
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The parties are deemed to have promised or agreed, if this is the
reasonable inference to be drawn from their words and acts, on the
supposition that they are reasonable men. In the interest of business
certainty, an objective standard is set which as a general rule they
are estopped from rebutting.
The seeming need to find a technical reason for holding the
parties to their utterances is a consequence of the view that the
utterances themselves are reports of mental states and therefore
inherently corrigible. The objective view of contract, if it is based
on estoppel, presupposes the truth of the subjective view. If, on the
other hand, we appreciate that the parties' utterances are important
in their own right, and are not merely reports of their states of mind,
both the logical and the moral attraction of the subjective view
begins to fade. If parties can logically enter into an agreement, and
be morally committed by it, without their minds being in
agreement, the legal edifice of contract can be built on the terra
firma of their outward acts, instead of on the shifting sands of their
subjective intentions. In this way, the legal standard of the
reasonable man can be projected directly into the acts of the parties
themselves, thus bridging the gulf between the abstract standard of
the reasonable man and the special knowledge of the parties in the
particular circumstances of the case. The legal standard of the
reasonable man is used merely to bring the parties up to a minimum
standard by interpreting their words and acts as if they were those of
reasonable men, and not to replace their standards with a different
standard altogether.
The most significant implication of Austin's account of
performatives for the law of contract is that it eliminates the source
of confusion between three very different questions: (i) Have two
parties entered into an agreement? (ii) Were the two parties in
agreement? (iii) Did one party agree to do somethihg? The
statement that there is an agreement between two parties entails that
they entered into an agreement, but the statement that they are in
agreement does not entail that they entered into an agreement, and
vice versa. An agreement is entered into by an exchange of
performative utterances which commit the parties to a course of
action or inaction or by means of conduct which takes the place of
such utterances. Being in agreement is a fact independent of
performative utterances. I agree is performative, and does not entail
either being in agreement or entering into an agreement. For
instance, the speaker may agree with another person out of
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politeness without being in agreement with him, and without
entering into an agreement with him. In that case one may say that
the performative I agree is used infelicitously because of the
speaker's dishonesty in much the same way as the performative I
promise is used infelicitously when there is no intention to honour
the promise; but it is not a case as we shall see where the
performance does not come off.
A contract is usually defined in terms of a promise or an
agreement, yet in practice the two concepts are often telescoped, an
agreement being considered as resulting from an exchange of
promises. A set of reciprocal promises, however, cannot be reduced
to the unilateral concept of promise; it rests on the concept of
bargain which I have defined as a special kind of agreement used to
effect a business-type of exchange.11 Although the concepts of
promise and bargain were intertwined in the development of the
common law, it never adopted a general principle of promissory
liability.
The concept of consideration (which requires a contract to be
supported by some sort of mutual contribution) is implicit in the
concept of bargain, but it has no intrinsic link with the concept of
promise. Hence, those who regard promise as the basic unit of
contract have little time for the doctrine of consideration. A promise
is essentially unilateral; it implies that the thing promised is desired
by the promisee, and for this reason it does not look to an
acceptance or rejection in the way an offer does. I have defined an
offer as the recognized procedure for proposing a bargain, which
may be accepted or rejected by the offeree. The performance
contemplated is bilateral or multilateral, and the offeror is
committed only if his offer is accepted. A promise, on the other
hand, contemplates a unilateral performance by the promisor, and
the promisor is committed as soon as he makes the promise. 12
I have suggested that the concept of contract is geared to bargain,
and that promise plays only a subsidiary part, particularly in
England and in Canada, where reliance on a promise does not
generally give rise to an action. 13 But it follows from what I have
said about the use of concepts that the legal model concept of
contract cannot be reduced to the ordinary concept of bargain.
11. Supra, note 1 at 198
12. Id. at 205
13. Id. at 206-07
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Whether or not a bargain has been made between two parties, and
what the terms of the bargain are, are questions of fact; whether or
not a contract exists between two parties, and what the terms of the
contract are, are questions of law, though the latter questions cannot
generally speaking be disposed of without regard to the former.
The fruitfulness of Austin's concept of performatives for a better
understanding of the legal concept of contract is not dependent on
the acceptance of a bargain theory. Both bargain and promise are
based on a code of morality which sanctions the making of binding
commitments and censures their breach; and in both cases the
commitments are made by means of performative utterances, or by
conduct which takes their place. What I have claimed is simply that
an analysis of the ordinary concepts of agreement and promise
makes a legal bargain theory of contract more attractive than a
promissory theory.
IV. Austin's Classification of Infelicities and their Legal Analogues
Austin calls the doctrine of the things that can be and go wrong on
the occasion of performative utterances, the doctrine of the
Infelicities. 14 Stated positively, he says, certain conditions or rules
must be satisfied, if a performative is to function happily or
felicitously. Austin states six such rules or conditions, without
claiming any sort of finality for them:
(A. 1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure
having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the
uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain
circumstances, and further,
(A.2) The particular persons and circumstances in a given case
must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure
invoked.
(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both
correctly and
(B.2) completely.
(F. 1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by
persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the
inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any
participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the
procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the
participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further
14. Supra, note 6 at 14
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(F. 2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently. 15
Although if we sin against any one (or more) of the six rules the
performative utterance will be unhappy, there are according to
Austin considerable differences between these ways of being
unhappy. The first big difference is between all the four rules A and
B taken together, and the two F cases. If we offend against any of
the A and B rules, then the act in question (e.g., marrying) is not
successfully performed at all, does not come off, in short, misfires,
whereas in the two F cases the act is achieved (e.g., when I say I
promise, but have no intention of keeping it) but abuses the
procedure.
When the utterance is a misfire, the procedure which we purport
to invoke is disallowed, and our act (marrying, etc.) is void or
without effect. We speak of our act as a purported act, or perhaps as
an attempt. On the other hand, in the F cases we speak of our
infelicitous act as professed or hollow rather than as purported or
empty, though these distinctions are by no means hard and fast. In
both the A cases there is a misinvocation of the procedure in
question (a misapplication in A.2), while in the B cases the
procedure exists and applies all right, but its execution is muffed.
There is a misexecution, the purported act is vitiated by a flaw (B.1)
or hitch 03.2) in the conduct of the ceremony.
I do not want to be drawn here into the subtleties of Austin's
linguistic differentiations between different kinds of infelicities,
particularly as he himself recognized the impossibility of
maintaining any hard and fast lines on grounds of ordinary linguistic
usage. The only thing which concerns me is the fruitfulness of
Austin's treatment of infelicities for a performative interpretation of
contract. It will be apparent that Austin's concept of infelicities is
merely the other side of his concept of performatives. Indeed, the
six rules stated by him are necessary conditions of the happy
functioning of performatives. It may be questioned, however,
whether infelicity is a good word to describe cases of misinvocation,
particularly where the procedure followed does not even exist as a
conventional procedure. Here, in Austin's own words, we are not
just dealing with an infelicity or unhappiness of something which
has come off, but with something which has never come off at all.
Yet, there is something which has come off, namely the utterance
15. Id. at 14-15
On Contracting
itself, though it has misfired, it was used in vain; it has failed to
achieve its purpose, since it could not trigger the right procedure
without which it remained ineffective.
The terms nullity and voidness immediately point to fruitful
analogies in contract. There too we find a seeming self-
contradiction in saying that a contract is a nullity or void. Either
there is a contract, in which case it cannot be void, or there is not, in
which case it does not exist at all. But what is meant by speaking of
a void contract is that a contract, which prina facie appears to be
valid, may on closer inspection turn out to be a complete nullity.
The case which lawyers have in mind is not so much that where
ignorant members of the public may be fooled by something which
looks like a contract as that where even a lawyer might be fooled
unless his attention is directed to the missing element. Hence, the
infelicity is one of misapplication of the procedure (A.2) rather than
its non-existence (A.1), and it is generally the former which is
important to lawyers. For instance, no common lawyer would be
fooled into believing that the making of a gratuitous promise (unless
under seal) can constitute a valid contract, but he might be fooled
into believing that there was consideration when on closer
investigation it turns out that there was none. We must remember
that legal concepts are technical or model concepts, not ordinary
language concepts, so that a contract may well not be supported by
consideration in law when in ordinary language it would be
regarded as so supported, and vice versa.
I have treated the case of no consideration as an example of
nullity, but it is not one which would immediately come to the mind
of a lawyer. What would come to his mind as a paradigm is a very
different case, namely mistake, which Austin together with
misunderstanding and things done under duress, by accident or
unintentionally, specifically excludes from infelicities proper, on
the ground that they belong to the dimensions of unhappiness to
which all actions - not just performative utterances - are
subject. 16 At common law, a mistake recognized by the law avoids
the contract ab initio; it makes it a complete nullity, so that not even
innocent third parties for value can as a general rule derive any
rights under it. The traditional explanation given is that the contract
is void because the mistake has prevented consensus ad idem, with
the silent corollary that there must be a subjective meeting of minds,
16. Id. at 21,42
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or concurrence of intentions, for a contract to come into existence.
In other words, the common law doctrine of mistake is based on the
subjective view of contract. Indeed, it enlarges the subjective view
at the expense of the qualifying principle of estoppel, for in
operative cases of mistake the party making the mistake is not
generally estopped by his external conduct from denying that he was
ad idern with the other party.
It is by no means clear to me why Austin should make a point of
distinguishing between wider infelicities and infelicities proper
which are restricted to acts of uttering words, since verbal
infelicities are merely a species of conventional infelicities. So far
as the law is concerned, the use of performative utterances is not
required for the formation of a contract. Some contracts have to be
under seal, and some have to be in writing or evidenced by writing,
but the general rule is that the conduct of the parties may take the
place of utterances. What is important is the conventional
behaviour, not the use of some ritual utterances.
Austin discusses consensus ad idem in connection with
misunderstanding:
One of the things that cause particular difficulty is the question
whether when two parties are involved 'consensus ad idern' is
necessary. Is it essential for me to secure correct understanding
as well as everything else? In any case this is clearly a matter
falling under the B rules and not under the IF rules. 
17
Misunderstanding is admittedly a different category from
mistake. The former involves a failure in communication, while the
latter may but need not be the result of such a failure. However, a
procedure may be appropriate only in the event of there being no
mistake or misunderstanding, or if there is consensus ad idern. This
is the extreme position of the subjective view of contract so far as
the procedure of contract is concerned. Why then should ultra vires
and incapacity be classified under rule A.2, 18 and consensus ad
idern under the B rules? If consensus ad idern is necessary, why is
the failure to achieve it just a flaw (B. 1) resulting in the
misexecution of the procedure, and not a circumstance which makes
the procedure inappropriate (A.2)?
In all the cases of infelicity discussed so far, the performance is a
nullity or void. In the last two types of case mentioned by Austin
17. Id. at 36
18. Id. at34
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(r. 1 and F.2) the performance is not void, although it is still
unhappy. These infelicities Austin calls insincerities and infractions
or breaches. 19 Where the procedure is designed for use by persons
having certain intentions, a person invoking it must in fact have
those intentions, and so conduct himself subsequently.
We have seen that Austin treats consensus ad idern in connection
with misunderstanding, which he excludes for infelicities proper,
but that he also classifies consensus ad idenz under the B rules and
not under the A and F rules. Yet, surely, how we should treat
consensus ad idem will depend on the role we ascribe to it in the
contract procedure. If it is conceived as a necessary condition of the
appropriateness of the procedure, or of its correct execution,
non-compliance will make the contract void. If, on the other hand,
it is conceived merely as a defect without nullifying the whole
transaction, non-compliance will not have this effect. On the
objective view of contract, the latter is the position which the law
should take.
Austin's distinction between the A and B groups, on the one
hand, and the IF groups of infelicities on the other - but not so
much his distinction within these groups - is extremely helpful in
exploring the concept of contract. If we ignore his exclusion of
mistake, misunderstanding and things done under duress, by
accident or unintentionally, we are left with two main groups of
deficiencies. We may then say that the first is so fundamental as to
derail the whole contract procedure, and that the second may be
invoked by the party prejudiced at his option, without preventing
the formation of a contract. On this view, a defect belonging to the
first group will not make a contract void on the wide subjective
ground of lack of consensus ad idem; it will be restricted to the
relatively narrow range of cases where the contract procedure totally
misfires. This will be so, for instance, where the parties have not
agreed on the terms of the agreement with reasonable certainty,
where the agreement is lacking in consideration, where there has not
been a legally sufficient communication of the acceptance, or where
an offer has been revoked or has been followed by a counter-offer
instead of by an acceptance.
A mistake by one or both parties will not make the contract void,
except in the case of a mutual mistake where the parties are at
cross-purposes, or of a mistake of identity ofparty. The first is really
19. Id. at 39
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a case of uncertainty of terms, and the second of uncertainty of
parties.20 A mere mistake will only make the contract voidable; it
will be a hitch which gives the mistaken party the right to avoid the
contract, or to obtain some other relief, if the court thinks that it has
an equity which should be enforced. This approach is taken by Lord
Denning in his doctrine of equitable mistake. While the effect of
mistake at common law is, as we have seen, to make the contract
void ab initio on the gound of lack of consensus ad idem, an
equitable mistake only gives rise to an equity, and this equity must
be balanced against possibly conflicting equities and considerations
of public policy. Unlike common law mistake, equitable mistake
allows for flexibility in the type of relief granted. For instance,
parties may be put on terms, in which case the contract is in effect
modified rather than avoided. The doctrine of equitable mistake is
limited to giving relief against the other parties to the contract, but
there is something to be said for allowing equitable relief against
negligent third parties, including the sharing of loss by apportion-
ment.
Fraud, consistently with Austin's treatment of it under
insincerities, does not make a contract void, only voidable.
Incapacity, on the other hand, which is classified under A.2, does
not always make a contract void. In some cases it is regarded merely
as an equity which may be raised by the party incapacitated. For
instance, certain infants' contracts are void and others are voidable.
Physical and moral duress makes a contract voidable and not
void. Perhaps here the law should draw the line between grosser
forms of duress which amount to an abuse of the contract procedure,
and undue influence and unconscionability, which merely give rise
to an equity to avoid the contract. A party may bind himself to a
contract unintentionally, if this is a reasonable inference to be drawn
on the supposition that he is a reasonable man. On the other hand, if
the parties expressly declare that they do not intend to be legally
bound by their agreement, they will not be so bound. A failure in
communication may, but need not, prevent the formation of a
contract. For instance, the failure of the offeror to hear a spoken
acceptance will generally have that effect, while the loss of a letter
of acceptance in the mail will not.
It should be noticed that not all defective contracts can be forced
20. See R. A. Samek, Some Reflections on the Logical Basis of Mistake of identity
of Party (1960), 38 Can. B. Rev. 479
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into the categories of void or voidable contracts. For instance,
illegal contracts may be afflicted by different degrees of voidness
depending on the degree of their turpitude. Unenforceable contracts
are valid, but they cannot be enforced by legal action.
V. The Channelling Function of Contract
Austin's concept of performatives is useful not only in throwing
new light on old problems of contract formation, but in another way
as well. As long as we think of contract in terms of the subjective
intentions of the parties, we will tend to think only of its remedial
function in particular cases, that is, of the static function of
protecting certain equities arising from the breach of a party's
promise or bargain. Austin's concept of performatives gives us
fresh insight into a very different function of contract, which has
been called its channelling function. 21 This function may be defined
as the dynamic social function of providing a simple, speedy,
flexible and effective procedure whereby private individuals and
interest groups may by themselves regulate their economic
relations. It is the use of this authorized procedure, and not the
expressed intentions of the parties, which creates contractual
obligations and rights. Hence, failure to follow it will prima facie
result in the complete nullity or voidness of the transaction. The
law, having laid down a certain procedure or channel which must be
followed if legal validity is to be given to the transaction, willprima
facie only recognize transactions if they have been channelled in the
proper way. However, in a common law system where law is made
by judges, legal norms are very open-textured. There are many
cases where it is impossible to predict whether the trial judge will
decide that the procedure used has been sufficient to create a valid
cdntract. The mere fact that it has not been conclusively sanctified
by a convention which is enshrined in a precedent, does not mean
that it will not be so sanctified in the future. Conversely, a
procedure which has been sanctified in the past, may become
desanctified by a new precedent.
21. Supra, note 1 at 208
